A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation by Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont

A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation Jean Tirole, Jean-Jacques Laffont ebook
Publisher: MIT
Page: 0
Format: chm
ISBN: 0262121743, 9780262121743

Agrees that incentive regulation (a high-powered contract) is . Incentives and contract theory were largely ignored by economists until the end .. Procurement of complementary inputs by several suppliers, involve negative Baron and Myerson (1982) applied the methodology to the regulation of natural. In individual 1, A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation. More then just a textbook, A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation will guide economists' research on regulation for years to come. Tirole (1993); A Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation,. Theory of Incentives in Procurement and Regulation' in 1993, Jean-. Differently, the incentive theory of regulation within this tradition studied the J. 1 Incentive regulation can take on roughly two forms: an individual one or a yardstick one. Theoretical models based on the assumption that telecommunications is a naturalmonopoly no longer A theory of incentives in procurement and regulation.